Evolutionary Concept, Genetic Algorithm and Exhibition Contract in Movie Industry by Ch'ng, Kean Siang
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Evolutionary Concept, Genetic
Algorithm and Exhibition Contract in
Movie Industry
Kean Siang Ch’ng
University Science Malaysia
3. October 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5138/
MPRA Paper No. 5138, posted 3. October 2007
Evolutionary Concept, Genetic Algorithm and
Exhibition Contract in Movie Industry
Ch’ng Kean Siang
University Science Malaysia
keansiang168@yahoo.com.hk
Abstract
The paper is about application of evolutionary concept, particu-
larly the application of natural selection process, to the study of movie
industry. The importance of the application is that it allows for the
heterogeneity and interdependency of market agents in analyzing the
economic choice decision. This complexity always presents an obstacle
to the study of market behavior, especially when one has to take into
account the constant reinforcing eﬀects among the variables, which
often renders the problem elusive. The paper intends to explain the
economic process, taking into account this complexity through the use
of evolutionary concept.
Keyword: Evolutionary selection, opportunity costs, learning and
sharing rule.
1 Introduction
Economic problems usually do not follow the reductionist approach, rather,
the analysis on economic choices sometimes requires us to look into the inter-
connectedness and heterogeneity of agents and the process these choices are
made. In this situation, the diversity at the micro level, the interrelatedness,
and the adaptive behavior become crucial to the analysis.
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This paper intends to illustrate this complexity in the market, with appli-
cation to movie industry. Our purpose is to relate the dynamics of economic
forces to the Post Darwinian natural selection process. The dynamism rests
on the interaction among the diverse agents in the market. Each time when a
new ﬁlm is introduced, it is tested with the existing environment; the incum-
bents and the movie goers’ taste. Some ﬁlms die out from the race, and others
stay on. The incumbents are then tested with new innovations again. Given
the limited number of screens to show the large number of new introductions,
the process of introduction and replacement is rapid and the competition is
stiﬀ. Thus, the industry agents, the distributor and exhibitor, have to con-
stantly alert of the trend of demand, the performance of the competitors, the
type of word of mouth spread in the market and other information, in order
to update their business strategies. This involves one to take into account
the diverse information available, pick and assess all the information, in or-
der to search for an optimal choice to suit the environment revealed during
that time. Thus, this requires one to learn. The learning process is what we
intend to explain in this paper. We apply an evolutionary approach to illus-
trate the natural selection process of business strategies; weaker strategies
are replaced with ﬁtter ones, given the information available at that time.
Although the reason of the market behavior, especially the supply de-
cision is explained in the past literature, the process, particularly how the
decision is made is not explored in detail. This maybe due to the limitation of
the conventional empirical method to account for the complexity and the dy-
namics concerned. This paper is one of the ﬁrst attempt to model the movie
industry using evolutionary approach, therefore, a number of methodologi-
cal issues may arise. The paper is to stir discussion on the methodological
aspects, especially related to movie industry.
The paper is divided into ﬁve sections. Section two relates the evolution-
ary concept, particularly the process, selection, mutation and replication, to
the movie industry. Section three illustrates the process of Genetic Algo-
rithm as a tool to implement the process, and search for optimal strategy.
Section four analyzes the results, and section ﬁve concludes.
2 Evolutionary concept in Movie Industry
Movie industry provides a fertile framework for evolutionary thinking in
view of the diversity of innovations and the constant interactions and co-
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ordinations which characterize the industry’s growth. The creation of new
innovations, the demise of the established ones, the constant shift in impor-
tance of surviving ﬁlms are ever present activities. The meaning of evolution
we want to refer to is the developmental idea of the internal unfolding activi-
ties and the post-Darwinian evolution of adaptation of populations under the
process of competitive selection. In this subsection, we propose to connect
the economic ideas, especially the constant change in the exhibition market,
with the nature of evolutionary concepts. The intention is to show how the
evolutionary change; selection, variation, ﬁtness and adaptation can be useful
aid to the study of industry’s change.
The central point is that the evolution provides a non-equilibrium account
of why the market changes. Evolutionary concepts explain the changing
patterns of co-existence among the innovations, the patterns describe the
relative importance of these innovations, and how the relative importance
changes over time; some are eliminated and others survive in a certain time
window. As such, the wide array of innovations in movie industry, and the
highly competitive environment provide a perfect framework to apply the
concept in the industry.
The implications of the competition in evolutionary term is two fold.
It replaces the thinking of representative behavior or uniform agents, with
one which has myriad of independent and diﬀerent behaviors. This is the
prerequisite for the evolutionary process to take place. This diversity is
caused by the diﬀerentiation strategy by the industry players. The ability to
adapt to new environment by the players, for example, the various capability
of players to respond instantaneously to the market demands also plays a
role. As the result, it gives birth to the population of movies which are
varied in terms of their characteristics, and with selective signiﬁcance which
makes the evolution process possible.
Secondly, in the evolutionary market institution, market competition does
not converge to eﬃciency, in the sense of resources allocation, but rather in
terms of adaptation to the new development revealed throughout the run.
Therefore, what distinguishes the evolutionary market is its openness to new
forms of activity and the ability to eliminate the obsolete ones when a ﬁlm
runs out of its marketability and shelf life.
In conventional equilibrium sense, the changes may converge to a rest
point, instead, in evolutionary concept, neither the changes of the types of
movie nor the box oﬃce, are attracted to a static reference point. Its argu-
ments provide a signiﬁcant explanation concerning the relative importance
3
of the agents to the development or the evolving of the characteristics of the
industry. For example; the introduction of talkies in the 1930s, the prac-
tice of vertical integration of distributors and the exhibitors, blind-booking,
the contracting practices and the splitting of revenues between the two par-
ties, explain there are two forms of change in the industry; transformational
change in the nature of the individual elements in the population and varia-
tional change in the composition of the population.
Thus, it is clear that the evolutionary theory is naturally a growth theory;
it is about the relative and absolute rates of expansion and contraction, and
about how ﬁlms use resources eﬀectively to optimize revenues throughout
the run.
2.1 Selection in Movie Industry
In this sub-section, we illustrate how the selection process takes place in the
movie industry, and how we can analyze the dynamics of the industry from
the evolutionary perspective. We begin with an individual movie as an entity,
which is the combination of genes or modules. When movie interacts and
competes in the market place, the success and failure depends on the “gene”
selected.
Gene refers to a particular characteristics or events which belong to a
movie, for example, the amount spent on advertising, the share of the exhi-
bition contract,the genre of the movie, the release strategy and so on which
characterizes the eﬀorts of agents to capture audience. So in each environ-
ment or time of consideration, there are diﬀerent genes, and each combination
or schema gives diﬀerent payoﬀ. So, there is a pool of schemata from which
the industry players can choose. Evolutionary process is a search process to
locate a ﬁt schema from the library of schemata.
We next deﬁne movie as an interactor in the market place. During the
interaction and competition process, if an ineﬃcient gene, and consequently
an ineﬃcient schema is selected, it renders the full potential of an interactor
not fully utilized. For example, if a highly potential ﬁlm is released in a non
peak season, it will cause the potential of the movie not fully utilized. In
this case, the release strategy is the gene, and this gene causes low payoﬀ.
Or in another case, if the release is synchronized with other high potential
movie, which has high cannibalization eﬀect, the ﬁlm will die prematurely.
Thus, again the release pattern and the characteristics of the movie are the
genes, and their combination or schema causes the ﬁlm to die faster. In an
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evolutionary dynamic implementation, it is interactor which interacts with
other interactors. And the factors which decide living and dying of the
interactor are the selection of genes and combination of these genes or schema
in the ongoing evolutionary dynamic process.
In a competition model of evolution, the units of selection are the sections
of schema that codes for “traits” that distinguishes one interactor from an-
other interactors in the competition to survive. For example, from the ﬁrst
case above, the unit of selection is done on the gene (the release pattern).
Natural selection process will alter the gene and the schema. Through
selection and replication; stronger gene and schema which can endure the
competition and propel the movie will be remained and subsequently repli-
cated. For example, if time is discrete, and there are many combinations of
genes in a particular time. Each of this combination gives diﬀerent payoﬀ,
and therefore, schema with higher payoﬀ will be selected to pass its traits to
other schema. The process will continue until the payoﬀ of each schema is
same.
2.2 Propagation of Genes
The survival of ﬁlm depends on type of genes and schema selected by the
agents. Therefore, industry players have to identify for schema which suits
the environment in order to survive the competition. This involves many
variables or genes and also large pool of combination of these variables or
schema. This requires eﬀort to look into the many eﬀects of the genes from
other movies on the ﬁlm’s performance, and make adjustment or selection
from the pool of genes to be taken to suit the environment. Therefore,
selection process is carried out to choose the most dominant or satisﬁcing
strategy even before the ﬁlm is released.
After the schema is decided, which usually takes into account the potential
revenue against “house nut”, the cannibalization eﬀect and marketability, the
ﬁlm is then run with other conpetitors. Thus, genes or schema selected are
used to assess its suitability against environment revealed. For example, the
gene (wide release pattern) is tested with the existing word of mouth of the
movie. If the gene (wide release pattern) is proven to be able to generate
large followings, the eﬀort is then adopted by the agents, in evolutionary
term, the gene is then propagated in the population. Thus, the spread of a
particular type of schema throughout the society or in a macro level is due
to the success of the gene to generate higher payoﬀ than other genes.
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3 Genetic Algorithm and Sharing Rule
We will perform simulation exercises to illustrate the evolutionary process
mentioned above. We will focus on the sharing rule in the exhibition con-
tract as an example for our case. We use Genetic Algorithm throughout the
simulation exercises.
This section intends to ﬁnd the most proﬁtable schema among the pop-
ulation of schema using Genetic Algorithm. The population of schema is
generated to reﬂect the diﬀerent potential revenue of each stream. Each
schema contributes to the derivation of ﬁtness, and a pair of ﬁtness are taken
randomly from the population to perform crossover and selection. The ﬁt-
ter’s gene is then passed to the weaker, and the weaker parent is replaced by
the child.
We ﬁrst generate a population of Box Oﬃce revenue each week for a
movie. In reality, distributor and exhibitor will take into account the oppor-
tunity costs,e.g. the potential revenues of other movies in the portfolio, the
cannibalization eﬀect from competitors, the distribution of revenue and the
house nut in deciding whether to continue or stop the play. The combination
of all these variables are converted into binary bits to enable crossover and
selection.
3.1 Distributor v.s Exhibitor
Tension between distributor and exhibitor occurs when there are increasing
number of movies vying for the limited slots available in the exhibition mar-
ket. This limits the run length and number of screen of a movie. It therefore,
requires eﬀective screen management to maximize proﬁt.
The dilemma is obvious when we investigate the objectives of distributor
and exhibitor. Distributor would want a suﬃcient time to play a movie, and
since prior release demand is not known, premature termination of the run
before the movie can reveal its potential is main concern to the distributor.
Further argument is that, if the movie has suﬃcient time, the revenue stream
in the subsequent runs will be higher than it is terminated early.
This objective is in conﬂict with the exhibitor’s, when the number of
screen and other movies in the portfolio are taken into account. For exhibitor,
if the movie is not generating enough revenue to cover the cost (house nut)
or the other movies in the portfolio can garner larger audience, the movie
should be replaced. Thus, the screen management decision usually takes the
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eﬀects of potential of other movies, seasonality, and the revenue stream of
the movie into account.
To mediate the conﬂict, revenue sharing contract is drawn to compensate
exhibitor for giving longer run time for the movie. If the collected Box Oﬃce
is high during the run, distributor’s portion in the revenue sharing contract
is higher, or the revenue sharing distribution should be in favor of distrib-
utor when the Box Oﬃce is low. This takes into account the opportunity
costs that a exhibitor incurs when deciding on the run length of the movie.
Large portion accrued to exhibitor when the total Box Oﬃce is low, enables
exhibitor to cover its cost, and at the same time discourage replacement.
In the ﬁrst simulation in the following, we intend to investigate the char-
acteristics of the changing contract given the demand revealed throughout
the run and the opportunity cost of not showing other ﬁlms. We intend
to ﬁnd how the changing contract can ensure longer run length and when
exhibitor should consider replacement strategy.
We generate population of revenue stream each week for a movie. The
decision to whether stop or continue a movie depends on the potential rev-
enue from other movies in the portfolio and the exhibition contract between
exhibitor and distributor. A movie will be replaced if the potential of other
movie in the portfolio is larger. In this subsection, we assume that available
strategies are varying degrees of ratios in contract. We intend to ﬁnd most
proﬁtable sharing rule given the demand of the movie and the other movies
in the portfolio.
3.2 Generation of population
We generate a random population of revenue for a movie and potential rev-
enue for other movies each week. The combination of these two categories
reside 60 bits in a binary string; the ﬁrst 30 bits reﬂects the ﬁlm’s demand
and the second 30 bits belong to the potential revenue or the cost of not
showing the other movie.
There are total of 70 bits in a binary string, which contributes to a schema;
a combination of demand, potential demand and a distribution contract. The
feature of the contract resides in the last 10 bits of the binary string.
We generate 50 binary strings in each population in every week of a
ﬁlm’s run, or 50 diﬀerent combinations of the movie’s demand and potential
demand. Similarly, the feature of the contract is varied among the population
given the demand of the movie.
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3.3 Fitness function
A binary string’s ﬁtness is calculated based on the nett demand collected
during the run, after deducting the opportunity cost; the potential demand
by other ﬁlms in the portfolio. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁtness is written as:
ﬁtness = (BOi
x
x+ y
)−BOI−i
where BO = Box Oﬃce of movie i and I is the total number of movies in
the portfolio (which is the opportunity cost for the exhibitor). The distribu-
tor’s contract consists of two parts; the portion accrued to exhibitor (x) and
(y) to distributor.
3.4 Genetic search process
Crossover allows binary string to exchange information with each other and
produce new “children” in the population. In our population, selection is
performed on two strings; ﬁtter string will pass its information to a weaker
string in order to improve the new generation. However, in order to search
for better or to vary the choices of the individuals, we allow the new child
produced to replace the one of the parents. The overall improvement is
made possible by this exchange of information from the stronger individual
to weaker individual.
The crossover is performed on the last 10 bits of a string; which contains
the information about the sharing rule in the contract. Fitness is then cal-
culated after the crossover for each string in the population. The number
of bits is taken randomly from the string of the parent, and pass on to the
child. The child will then replace the weaker parent.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Contract to encourage play
After the ﬁlm is released, distributor faces a dilemma between increasing
the revenue and shortening the run length; if the objective is to increase
the revenue on a particular week through extracting higher revenue from
the contract, exhibitor’s share will be lower and thus distributor risks early
termination of his ﬁlm. On the other hand, if distributor allows higher share
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to the exhibitor, the share accrued to the distributor is lower and thus cannot
cover the costs. To solve this dilemma, distributor would want to ﬁnd a
sharing contract which could help maximize the revenue and at the same
time avoid premature termination.
Given the revenue revealed and the opportunity costs, and the constraint
faced by the distributor, distribution contract should be able to ensure posi-
tive ﬁtness or real revenue collected by exhibitor. We use the method Genetic
Algorithm to search for the satisﬁcing contract among the population of con-
tracts each week. The contract revealed through the method should be able
to maximize the revenue collected by the distributor and also avoid termi-
nation by the exhibitor. Figure 1 through ﬁgure 8 exhibit the change of
ﬁtness through crossover and replacement of gene among the populations for
generation 10 to generation 200. The method reveals which contract, given
the opportunity costs and the gross revenue collected, ensure positive ﬁtness
or real revenue to the exhibitor and therefore, how large the portion of the
revenue should be collected by distributor. In the ﬁrst week of the run, as
shown in ﬁgure 1, gene of individual contract in the population is selected
and replaced by the new individual produced from the crossover and muta-
tion. Since one of the parents quality gene is passed over to the child, better
new generation is produced progressively throughout the generations. This
new generation should be able to ensure positive ﬁtness but would not allow
for too much real revenue to the exhibitor to avoid exhibitor from enjoying
highest potential of the ﬁlm.
Although if the gross collected exceeds one million per week, the ex-
hibitor’s portion is ﬁxed to be in the region 10% and 30% and if less 70% to
80%. To avoid too much of the potential enjoyed by the exhibitor, distrib-
utor will seek for most optimal contract which ensure proﬁtable run for the
exhibitor and larger portion enjoyed by himself. Thus, Genetic Algorithm
reveals the diﬀerent contract in diﬀerent revenue collected and opportunity
costs throughout the ﬁlm’s run. In the ﬁgures, some individuals in the pop-
ulation are able to progress to higher ﬁtness, and those not able are facing
high opportunity costs, which renders the ﬁtness to be stagnant. As in ﬁgure
3, the ﬁtness in the population is not improved as in other ﬁgures, because
the opportunity cost for each situation is high, and therefore, ﬁtness cannot
be improved after 200 generations.
The distribution contract allows distributor to optimize the revenue and
at the same time avoid premature termination. This is achieved through
searching for positive ﬁtness given the opportunity costs for each ﬁlm. Figure
9
9 exhibits the changing contract and ﬁtness each week of the run. The ﬁlm
attracts high revenue from week 1 to week 7, within which the opportunity
cost or the cost of not showing the other ﬁlm is lower than the revenue
collected for the ﬁlm. This allows distributor to ﬁx a contract between 10%
to 20% and ensure positive ﬁtness or nett revenue collected for the exhibitor.
Positive ﬁtness allows the ﬁlm to run for longer period and the ratio avoids
exhibitor from enjoying too high the potential of the ﬁlm. However, the
declining revenue after week 7th increases the contract to 90%, which belong
to the exhibitor. The change allows exhibitor to extract higher revenue from
the gross, and induce him to continue the play.
Figure 10 illustrates a changing contract when the ﬁlm exhibits a strong
leg. Opportunity cost is higher than the revenue collected in the ﬁrst week of
the run. To avoid termination and ensure play, distributor allows exhibitor
to enjoy 90% of the collected revenue. This continues to the third week
of the run. The strong leg exhibits by the ﬁlm allows distributor to lower
the contract beneﬁt to 20% in the forth week, and still the ﬁtness is in the
positive region. This continues to ﬁfth and sixth week of the run. In week 7,
distributor increases the beneﬁt to 90%, to induce exhibitor to continue play
the movie.
4.2 Contract to share risks
The variability of demand is the main concern of the risk sharing contract.
In the paper by Hanssen (2002) and Filson et al (2004) argue that the unpre-
dictability of demand ex ante rules out the theory of asymmetric informa-
tion. Furthermore, the arrival of talkies or sound in 1930s renders the change
of production structure in the studio; before sound, movies are identiﬁable
through roster of stars employed on the studio’s payroll and the demand is
predictable. Its introduction increases the production costs and concerns of
studio’s downside risk.
This high unpredictability also worries the exhibitor if he rented the ﬁlm
for a ﬂat fees. If the ﬁlm is rented out a ﬂat fee to the exhibitor, the downside
risk is transferred from studio to exhibitor. In the event of high budget ﬂop,
it will wipe out the entire stream of revenue which the exhibitor collected.
Thus, risk sharing contract requires distributor and studio to share portion
of the risk with the exhibitor.
Before sound, input from exhibitors contributed to the success of a ﬁlm,
through the life music accompanied during the play. In the era, exhibitors
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became the large residual claimant of the revenue collected, and ﬁlm was
rented out with a ﬂat fee. Flat rental fee prevented shirking from exhibitor.
However, with the advent of sound, risk sharing contract became the norm.
The attraction of a ﬁlm is no longer depends on the life sound staged by the
exhibitors; people go to see movie because of the ﬁlm itself. This reduces the
beneﬁt for shirking. In the sound era, allowing exhibitor to share the revenue
encourages him to continue the play, and compare with ﬂat fee, it discourages
pre mature termination. Thus, sharing contract eliminates beneﬁts for the
exhibitor to shirk, and compensates him through taking the risk of prolonging
the life of a ﬁlm.
The risk sharing element of an exhibition contract is illustrated in our
simulation exercise in ﬁgure 9. When the movie is ﬁrst released, the high
demand it garnered in the ﬁrst three weeks of the run compensates the high
risk averse party, in this case is distributor. During this interval, “Best Week
Clause” and “Holdover Clause” are triggered to compensate the high risk
party. Lower risk averse party, the exhibitor, is compensated with lower
portion of the total revenue collected, which are in the 20% region. Based
on the ﬁtness or net revenue accrued to the exhibitor, it should be able to
cover the opportunity cost or the reservation utility which are derived from
the cost of not showing other movies in the portfolio.
However, the opportunity cost of the exhibitor rises in the subsequent
runs of the ﬁlm. This requires higher compensation to justify for the longer
run life. After 7th week of the run, the opportunity cost of not showing other
movies increases, i.e. the risk borne by exhibitor increases, and therefore, it
deserves a higher reward to showing the ﬁlm. Similarly, to encourage run
length, exhibitor should be rewarded with accordance with the risk they
bear. In ﬁgure 10, high opportunity cost in the ﬁrst week of the run requires
distributor to allow exhibitor to enjoy larger portion of the revenue. The
risk drops after the ﬁlm is revealed to be able to garner large followings,
and therefore, the payment accrued to the exhibitor diminishes. The risk
gradually increases after the 6th week of the run, and based on the risk
sharing rule, it would given larger share of the revenue collected.
Thus, the revision of the dynamic distribution contract is based on the
apportionment of the risk between the parties. With assumption that the op-
portunity cost is not constant, due to the new introduction of new products,
our simulation result shows the concave sharing rule.
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5 Conclusion
The paper suggests an evolutionary approach to the study of movie indus-
try. This application to model the complexity leads us to relook into the
the economic behavior which are usually analyzed follow the reductionist
approach. We argue in the paper that the complexities; interdependency
of heterogenous market agents, constant interactions and learning, present
a constantly reinforcing eﬀect, which renders the decision making dynamic
and non-converging. This environment, requires one to employ a diﬀerent
methodology to analyze the decision making process. The paper is the ﬁrst
to relate dynamics in movie industry to the nature, and it would create much
methodological concerns. Its purpose is to stir discussion on the evolutionary
concept, particularly its application to the study of movie industry.
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Figure 1: The change of ﬁtness in generations given the potential revenues for other
movies (week 1)
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Figure 2: The change of ﬁtness in generations given the potential revenues for other
movies (week 2)
14
Figure 3: The change of ﬁtness in generations given the potential revenues for other
movies (week 3)
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Figure 4: The change of ﬁtness in generations given the potential revenues for other
movies (week 4)
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Figure 5: The change of ﬁtness in generations given the potential revenues for other
movies (week 5)
17
Figure 6: The change of ﬁtness in generations given the potential revenues for other
movies (week 6)
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Figure 7: The change of ﬁtness in generations given the potential revenues for other
movies (week 7)
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Figure 8: The change of ﬁtness in generations given the potential revenues for other
movies (week 8)
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Figure 9: The eﬀect of changing contract on extending the length of a ﬁlm. The ﬁtness
function is written as (BOi xx+y )−BOI−i, where x = 0.1 if BOi > 10m, and if BOi < 10m,
x = 0.3 in ﬁrst and second week, x = 0.4 in third week, x = 0.5 in fourth week, and x = 0.6
in ﬁfth week. During the search process by GA, the constraints of the percentage is set,
and the less than optimal contract is replaced. For example, during the ﬁrst two weeks of
the run, GA will stop at x = 10%, and those with x < 10% or x > 10% will be replaced.
The purpose of the process is to search for the most optimal contract, and at the same time
ensures positive ﬁtness of this selected contract. Note that if the ﬁtness falls to negative
region, means that with the given contract, the revenue cannot cover the opportunity cost.
It means the movie will be replaced.
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Figure 10: The eﬀect of changing contract on extending the length of a ﬁlm (when the
movie exhibits strong strength
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